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Abstract
We show that using character sum estimates due to H. Iwaniec leads to an im-
provement of recent results about the distribution and finding RSA moduli M = pl,
where p and l are primes, with prescribed bit patterns. We are now able to specify
about n bits instead of about n/2 bits as in the previous work. We also show that
the same result of H. Iwaniec can be used to obtain an unconditional version of a
combinatorial result of W. de Launey and D. Gordon that was originally derived
under the Extended Riemann Hypothesis.
Key words: RSA, bit pattern, sparse integer, smooth integer, character sum,
Hadamard matrices
1 Introduction
For an integer n, we use Pn to denote the set of primes p with 2
n−1 < p < 2n.
Let Mn be the set of RSA moduli M = pℓ that are products of two distinct
primes p, ℓ ∈ Pn.
Thus each M ∈ Mn has either 2n − 1 or 2n bits which we number from the
right to the left.
Motivated by some cryptographic applications (in particular by the idea of
reducing the size of the public key), various heuristic algorithms have been
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given to construct moduli M ∈ Mn having a sufficiently long specified bit
pattern have been given in [7,11]. Unfortunately, giving a rigorous analysis of
these algorithms require a very strong form of Linnik’s Theorem, which far
exceeds our current state of knowledge.
A different algorithm was proposed in [10]. Certainly this algorithm is likely
to produce moduli having shorter prescribed bit patterns than those of [7,11].
However, using exponential sums, this algorithm has been rigorously analysed
and shown to output in expected polynomial time a desired modulusM ∈Mn
with about n/2 prescribed bits.
Here we use the bound of character sums of H. Iwaniec [5] (see also [2,3] and
references therein) instead of bounds on exponential sums. This allows us to
show that in fact the same algorithm can be used to generate in expected
polynomial time a desired RSA modulus M ∈ Mn with about n prescribed
bits.
Our result immediately yields an improvement Theorem 5 in [10], producing
RSA moduli M ∈Mn with with at least (3/2+ o(1))n zero bits. As in [10] we
remark that such moduli may be useful for the Paillier cryptosystem, see [9],
where one computes Mth powers.
We also outline some possible applications of the same ideas to generating
sparse RSA moduli and smooth numbers (that is, numbers free of large prime
factors) with a prescribed bit pattern, hence improving some other results
of [10].
We end up with an observation that the results of [5] can also be used to
eliminate the assumption of the Extended Riemann Hypothesis from a result
of W. de Launey and D. Gordon [1]
Throughout the paper, P denotes the set of primes and ln z denotes the natural
logarithm of z > 0.
2 RSA Moduli with Prescribed Bit Patterns
We recall the algorithm of [10] to generate an RSA modulus M having a
desired bit pattern on certain positions.
Given a binary string σ of length m, we denote byMn,m(σ) the set consisting
of M ∈ Mn such that the bits of M at the positions n − 1, . . . , n −m form
the binary string σ.
2
Algorithm RSA−Modulus(n,m, σ)
Step 1 Choose an odd integer k in the interval 1 ≤ k < 2n−m and a prime p ∈ Pn
uniformly at random.
Step 2 Compute the positive integer r < 2n which satisfies the congruence
pr ≡ 2n−ms+ k (mod 2n),
where s is the integer whose binary representation coincides with σ.
Step 3 Test whether 2n−1 < r, r 6= p and also test r for primality, if r is prime
then put l = r and output M = pl, otherwise go to Step 1 and start a
new round of the algorithm.
Certainly, if Algorithm RSA-Modulus(n,m, σ) terminates it outputs M ∈
Mn,m(σ).
Theorem 1 For m =
⌊
n− n3/4 lnn
⌋
and any binary string σ of length m,
Algorithm RSA-Modulus(n,m, σ) terminates in expected polynomial time.
Proof. As in [10], for an integer 0 ≤ k ≤ 2n−m − 1, we denote by N(k) the
number of solutions p, l ∈ Pn to the congruence pl ≡ 2
n−ms + k (mod 2n)
where binary representation of the integer s is given by the string σ (certainly
N(k) = 0 for every even k).
Let X be the set of multiplicative characters modulo 2n (see [6, Chapter 3] for
a background on characters and character sums).
We also use X ∗ to denote the set of nonprincipal characters. We recall the
orthogonality relation
∑
χ∈X
χ(u) =


0, if u 6≡ 1 (mod 2n),
2n−1, if u ≡ 1 (mod 2n),
(1)
see [6, Section 3.2].
By (1), we have
N(k) =
1
2n−1
∑
p,ℓ∈Pn
∑
χ∈X
χ
(
(2n−ms− k)p−1ℓ−1
)
,
where the inverse values p−1 and ℓ−1 are taken modulo 2n.
Changing the order of summation and separating the term (#Pn)
22−n+1 cor-
responding to the principal character we obtain
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N(k) = (#Pn)
22−n+1 +
1
2n−1
∑
χ∈X ∗
χ
(
2n−ms+ k
) ∑
p,l∈Pn
χ
(
p−1ℓ−1
)
= (#Pn)
22−n+1 +
1
2n−1
∑
χ∈X ∗
χ
(
2n−ms+ k
)∑
p∈Pn
χ
(
p−1
)
2
.
Therefore
2n−m−1∑
k=0
N(k) =
(#Pn)
2
2m
+∆, (2)
where
∆ =
1
2n−1
∑
χ∈X ∗
2n−m−1∑
k=0
χ
(
2n−ms+ k
)∑
p∈Pn
χ
(
p−1
)
2
.
Using the triangle inequality, we conclude that
|∆|=
1
2n−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
χ∈X ∗
2n−m−1∑
k=0
χ
(
2n−ms+ k
)∑
p∈Pn
χ
(
p−1
)
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
1
2n−1
∑
χ∈X ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2n−m−1∑
k=0
χ
(
2n−ms+ k
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
p∈Pn
χ
(
p−1
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
2n−1
∑
χ∈X ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2n−m−1∑
k=0
χ
(
2n−ms+ k
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
p∈Pn
χ (p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
since the values of χ(p) and χ (p−1) are conjugated over C.
We now recall that by [5, Lemma 6],
2n−m−1∑
k=0
χ
(
2n−ms+ k
)
≪ 2n−mn−2
provided that
2n−m ≫ 2n
3/4 lnn.
which is satisfied for our choice of m.
Therefore
|∆|≪
1
2mn2
∑
χ∈X ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
p∈Pn
χ (p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
1
2mn2
∑
χ∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
p∈Pn
χ (p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
2mn2
∑
p,ℓ∈Pn
∑
χ∈X
χ
(
pℓ−1
)
.
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By (1) we see that inner sum vanishes unless p ≡ ℓ (mod 2n), which is equiv-
alent to p = ℓ. Therefore
|∆| ≪
2n−m#Pn
n2
. (3)
Since #Pn ≫ 2
nn−1, substituting the bound (3) in (2) we derive
2n−m−1∑
k=0
N(k) =
(
1 +O(n−1)
) (#Pn)2
2m
.
This is a full analogue of the asymptotic formula (4) in [10] (except that the
value of m is now different). Accordingly, the rest of the proof is identical to
that of Theorem 4 in [10]. ⊓⊔
As we have remarked, Theorem 1 immediately yields the following improve-
ment Theorem 5 in [10] which can be have some application for for the Paillier
cryptosystem (see [9]).
Corollary 1 For m =
⌈
n− n3/4 lnn
⌉
and the m-dimensional zero string
ϑ = (0, . . . , 0) of length m, Algorithm RSA-Modulus(n,m, ϑ) terminates
in expected polynomial time and with probability 1 + o(1) outputs a modulus
M ∈ Mn with at most (1/2 + o(1))n nonzero bits.
3 Other Applications
One can use a similar approach to improve Theorem 6 of [10] which guarantees
the existence of certain smooth numbers with prescribed bit patterns.
Moreover, without any substantial changes, an analogue of Theorem 1 can
be obtained for the values of the Euler function ϕ(pℓ) = (p − 1)(ℓ − 1). For
example, one can prove that for any r, there are r-bit integers R such that
the binary expansion of ϕ(R) contains (3/4 + o(1))r nonzero digits. This can
be extended to g-ary expansions for any base g.
Finally, we conclude with noticing that the results of [3] and [5] have direct
implications on the distribution of primes in arithmetic progressions modulo
2n. P. X. Gallagher [3] proves that if q = pr (p odd) and if q · x3/5+ǫ ≤ h ≤ x,
then
ψ(x+ h, q, a)− ψ(x, q, a) ∼
h
ϕ(q)
(4)
whenever (a, q) = 1, where, as usual,
ψ(x, q, a) =
∑
k≤x
k≡a (mod q)
Λ(k)
5
and
Λ(k) =


log p if k is a power of a prime p,
0 otherwise,
is the von Mangoldt function, see [6, Chapter 5.9]. The exponent 3/5 came
from appealing to a zero-density estimate of H. L. Montgomery [8]. For techni-
cal reasons, P. X. Gallagher [3] excludes consideration of the case p = 2, but his
proof can be easily modified to this case. The details of this modification (and
much more) have been given by H. Iwaniec [5]. By using a zero-density result
of Huxley [4] in conjunction with [5], one sees that (4) is true with q = 2r and
q · x7/12+ǫ ≤ h ≤ x. This result can be used in place of the Extended Riemann
Hypothesis in the paper of W. de Launey and D. Gordon [1]. In particular, in
the last undisplayed equation on page 184 of [1], one may take y =
⌊
n7/12+ǫ
⌋
.
In turn, this yields an unconditional version of Theorem 1.2 of [1], albeit with
a weaker error term:
r(N) ≥
N
2
+O(N113/132+o(1))
for any N ≡ 0 (mod 4), where r(N) is the largest R for which there is a R×N
Hadamard matrix (that is, ±1 matrix H with HHT = NIR, where IR is the
R× R identity matrix). The exponent 113/132 arises as
α
1 + α
+
7
12
=
113
132
,
where, as in [1], we take α = 3/8. In the conditional result of W. de Launey
and D. Gordon [1], the 7/12 term is replaced by 1/2, thus giving the exponent
7
22
=
113
132
−
1
12
.
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